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  How	  should	  we	  judge	  competing	  explanatory	  claims	  in	  social	  science	  research?	  How	  can	  we	  make	  inferences	  about	  which	  alternative	  explanations	  are	  more	  convincing,	  in	  what	  ways,	  and	  to	  what	  degree?	  Case	  study	  methods—especially	  methods	  of	  within-­‐case	  analysis	  such	  as	  process	  tracing—	  are	  an	  indispensable	  part	  of	  the	  answer	  to	  these	  questions	  (George	  and	  Bennett	  2005:	  chap.	  10).	  This	  chapter	  offers	  an	  overview	  of	  process	  tracing	  as	  a	  tool	  for	  causal	  inference,	  focusing	  on	  the	  study	  of	  international	  relations,	  an	  area	  rich	  with	  examples	  of	  this	  approach.1	  	  In	  contrast	  to	  the	  subsequent	  two	  chapters	  in	  this	  volume	  (chaps.	  11	  and	  12),	  where	  Freedman	  and	  Brady	  analyze	  micro-­‐level	  examples,	  the	  present	  chapter	  explores	  process	  tracing	  in	  macro	  studies.	  	  This	  chapter	  uses	  three	  explanatory	  puzzles,	  about	  which	  scholars	  have	  advanced	  contending	  hypotheses,	  to	  illustrate	  how	  process	  tracing	  helps	  adjudicate	  among	  alternative	  explanations:	  (1)	  why	  and	  how	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  and	  France	  resolved	  their	  competing	  imperial	  claims	  to	  the	  Upper	  Nile	  Valley	  without	  resorting	  to	  the	  use	  of	  force	  in	  the	  Fashoda	  crisis	  of	  1898,	  an	  outcome	  that	  has	  been	  the	  subject	  of	  considerable	  research	  given	  	  	  	  	  	  Maria	  Gould,	  Jody	  La	  Porte,	  and	  Miranda	  Yaver	  provided	  valuable	  comments	  on	  an	  earlier	  draft	  of	  this	  chapter.	  	  	  1.	  Good	  examples	  include	  Drezner	  (1999),	  Eden	  (2004),	  George	  and	  Smoke	  (1974),	  Homer-­‐Dixon	  (1999),	  Khong	  (1992),	  Knopf	  (1998),	  Larson	  (1997),	  Moravcsik	  (1998),	  Owen	  (1997),	  Rock	  (1989,	  2000),	  Sagan	  (1993),	  Shafer	  (1988),	  Snyder	  (1984,	  1991),	  Walt	  (1996),	  and	  Weber	  (1991).	  Brief	  descriptions	  of	  the	  research	  designs	  employed	  by	  Drezner,	  George	  and	  Smoke,	  Homer-­‐Dixon,	  Khong,	  Knopf,	  
Larson,	  Owen,	  Sagan,	  Shafer,	  Snyder,	  and	  Weber	  are	  provided	  by	  George	  and	  Bennett	  (2005:	  118–119,	  194–97,	  302–325).	  
 	  its	  relevance	  to	  the	  inter-­‐democratic	  peace	  hypothesis;	  (2)	  why	  in	  the	  middle	  of	  World	  War	  I,	  despite	  strong	  evidence	  that	  it	  was	  likely	  to	  be	  defeated,	  Germany	  expanded	  its	  war	  goals—for	  example,	  shifting	  to	  unrestricted	  submarine	  warfare—even	  though	  this	  risked	  (and	  in	  fact,	  resulted	  in)	  American	  entry	  into	  the	  conflict;	  and	  (3)	  why	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  did	  not	  intervene	  militarily	  in	  the	  Central	  European	  revolutions	  of	  1989,	  in	  contrast	  to	  its	  military	  interventions	  in	  Hungary	  in	  1956	  and	  Czechoslovakia	  in	  1968.	  
	  
	  
OVERVIEW	  OF	  PROCESS	  TRACING	  	  Process	  tracing	  involves	  the	  examination	  of	  ‘‘diagnostic’’	  pieces	  of	  evidence	  within	  a	  case2	  that	  contribute	  to	  supporting	  or	  overturning	  alternative	  explanatory	  hypotheses.	  A	  central	  concern	  is	  with	  sequences	  and	  mechanisms	  in	  the	  unfolding	  of	  hypothesized	  causal	  processes.3	  The	  researcher	  looks	  for	  the	  observable	  implications	  of	  hypothesized	  explanations,	  often	  examining	  at	  a	  finer	  level	  of	  detail	  or	  a	  lower	  level	  of	  analysis	  than	  that	  initially	  posited	  in	  the	  relevant	  theory.	  The	  goal	  is	  to	  establish	  whether	  the	  events	  or	  processes	  within	  the	  case	  fit	  those	  predicted	  by	  alternative	  explanations.	  	  This	  mode	  of	  analysis	  is	  closely	  analogous	  to	  a	  detective	  attempting	  to	  solve	  a	  crime	  by	  looking	  at	  clues	  and	  suspects	  and	  piecing	  together	  a	  convincing	  explanation,	  based	  on	  fine-­‐grained	  evidence	  that	  bears	  on	  potential	  suspects’	  means,	  motives,	  and	  opportunity	  to	  have	  committed	  the	  crime	  in	  question.	  It	  is	  also	  analogous	  to	  a	  doctor	  trying	  to	  diagnose	  an	  illness	  by	  taking	  in	  the	  details	  of	  a	  patient’s	  case	  history	  and	  symptoms	  and	  applying	  diagnostic	  tests	  that	  can,	  for	  example,	  distinguish	  between	  a	  viral	  and	  a	  bacterial	  infection	  (Gill,	  Sabin,	  and	  Schmid	  2005).	  	  Process	  tracing,	  which	  focuses	  on	  the	  diagnostic	  intervening	  steps	  in	  a	  hypothesized	  causal	  process,	  can	  provide	  inferential	  leverage	  on	  two	  problems	  that	  are	  difficult	  to	  address	  through	  statistical	  analysis	  alone.	  The	  first	  is	  the	  challenge	  of	  establishing	  causal	  direction:	  if	  X	  and	  Y	  are	  correlated,	  	  	  2.	  A	  case	  may	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  temporally	  and	  spatially	  bounded	  instance	  of	  a	  specified	  phenomenon.	  Although	  process	  tracing	  focuses	  on	  events	  within	  a	  case,	  it	  can	  play	  a	  role	  in	  comparisons	  of	  cases.	  An	  analyst	  can	  use	  process	  tracing,	  for	  example,	  to	  assess	  whether	  a	  variable	  whose	  value	  differs	  in	  two	  most	  similar	  cases	  is	  related	  to	  the	  difference	  in	  their	  outcomes.	  3.	  Process	  tracing	  is	  also	  used	  as	  a	  method	  of	  discovering	  hypotheses,	  a	  contribution	  
illustrated	  above	  in	  Freedman’s	  contribution	  (chap.	  11).	  However,	  that	  facet	  is	  not	  addressed	  in	  the	  present	  chapter.	  
	  	  did	  X	  cause	  Y,	  or	  did	  Y	  cause	  X?	  Careful	  process	  tracing	  focused	  on	  the	  sequencing	  of	  who	  knew	  what,	  when,	  and	  what	  they	  did	  in	  response,	  can	  help	  address	  this	  question.	  It	  might,	  for	  example,	  establish	  whether	  an	  arms	  race	  caused	  a	  war,	  or	  whether	  the	  anticipation	  of	  war	  caused	  an	  arms	  race.	  A	  second	  challenge	  is	  that	  of	  potential	  spuriousness:	  if	  X	  and	  Y	  are	  correlated,	  is	  this	  because	  X	  caused	  Y,	  or	  is	  it	  because	  some	  third	  variable	  caused	  both	  X	  and	  Y?	  Here,	  process	  tracing	  can	  help	  establish	  whether	  there	  is	  a	  causal	  chain	  of	  steps	  connecting	  X	  to	  Y,	  and	  whether	  there	  is	  such	  evidence	  for	  other	  variables	  that	  may	  have	  caused	  both	  X	  and	  Y.	  	  	  There	  is	  no	  guarantee	  that	  researchers	  will	  include	  in	  their	  analyses	  the	  variable(s)	  that	  actually	  caused	  Y,	  but	  process	  tracing	  backward	  from	  observed	  outcomes	  to	  potential	  causes—as	  well	  as	  forward	  from	  hypothesized	  causes	  to	  subsequent	  outcomes—allows	  researchers	  to	  uncover	  variables	  they	  have	  not	  previously	  considered.	  This	  is	  similar	  to	  how	  a	  detective	  can	  work	  forward	  from	  suspects	  and	  backwards	  from	  clues	  about	  a	  crime.	  It	  is	  likewise	  consistent	  with	  David	  Freedman’s	  argument	  (chap.	  11,	  this	  volume)	  that	  case	  expertise	  and	  substantive	  knowledge	  can	  play	  a	  key	  role	  in	  sorting	  out	  explanations—a	  claim	  that	  may	  for	  some	  readers	  appear	  counter-­‐intuitive	  in	  light	  of	  Freedman’s	  disciplinary	  background	  as	  a	  mathematical	  statistician.	  	  Critics	  have	  raised	  two	  critiques	  of	  process	  tracing:	  the	  ‘‘infinite	  regress’’	  problem	  and	  the	  ‘‘degrees	  of	  freedom’’	  problem.	  On	  the	  former,	  King,	  Keohane,	  and	  Verba	  suggest	  that	  the	  exceedingly	  fine-­‐grained	  level	  of	  detail	  involved	  in	  process	  tracing	  can	  potentially	  lead	  to	  an	  infinite	  regress	  of	  studying	  ‘‘causal	  steps	  between	  any	  two	  links	  in	  the	  chain	  of	  causal	  mechanisms’’	  (1994:	  86).	  Others	  have	  worried	  that	  qualitative	  research	  on	  a	  small	  number	  of	  cases	  with	  a	  large	  number	  of	  variables	  suffers	  from	  a	  degrees	  of	  freedom	  problem.	  This	  form	  of	  indeterminacy	  afflicts	  statistical	  studies,	  given	  that	  the	  number	  of	  cases	  in	  a	  data	  set	  must	  be	  far	  greater	  than	  the	  number	  of	  variables	  in	  a	  model	  to	  test	  that	  model	  through	  frequentist	  statistics.	  	  The	  answer	  to	  both	  critiques	  is	  that	  not	  all	  data	  are	  created	  equal.	  With	  process	  tracing,	  not	  all	  information	  is	  of	  equal	  probative	  value	  in	  discriminating	  between	  alternative	  explanations,	  and	  a	  researcher	  does	  not	  need	  to	  examine	  every	  line	  of	  evidence	  in	  equal	  detail.	  It	  is	  possible	  for	  one	  piece	  of	  evidence	  to	  strongly	  affirm	  one	  explanation	  and/or	  disconfirm	  others,	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  numerous	  other	  pieces	  of	  evidence	  might	  not	  discriminate	  among	  explanations	  at	  all.	  What	  matters	  is	  not	  the	  amount	  of	  evidence,	  but	  its	  contribution	  to	  adjudicating	  among	  alternative	  hypotheses.	  Further,	  even	  a	  single	  case	  may	  include	  many	  salient	  pieces	  of	  evidence.	  The	  noted	  methodologist	  Donald	  Campbell	  recognized	  the	  value	  of	  process-­‐	  
focused	  tools	  of	  inference	  when	  he	  abandoned	  his	  earlier	  criticism	  of	  case	  studies	  as	  lacking	  degrees	  of	  freedom,	  and	  argued	  in	  favor	  of	  a	  method	  similar	  to	  the	  process	  tracing	  under	  discussion	  here	  (Campbell	  1975).	  	  More	  concretely,	  process	  tracing	  involves	  several	  different	  kinds	  of	  empirical	  tests,	  focusing	  on	  evidence	  with	  different	  kinds	  of	  probative	  value.	  Van	  Evera	  (1997:	  31–32)	  has	  distinguished	  four	  such	  tests	  that	  contribute	  in	  distinct	  ways	  to	  confirming	  and	  eliminating	  potential	  explanations.	  They	  are	  summarized	  briefly	  here,	  and	  will	  then	  be	  applied	  and	  illustrated	  throughout	  this	  chapter.	  
	  
Hoop	  tests,	  which	  are	  central	  to	  the	  discussion	  below,	  can	  eliminate	  alternative	  hypotheses,	  but	  they	  do	  not	  provide	  direct	  supportive	  evidence	  for	  a	  hypothesis	  that	  is	  not	  eliminated.	  They	  provide	  a	  necessary	  but	  not	  sufficient	  criterion	  for	  accepting	  the	  explanation.	  The	  hypothesis	  must	  ‘‘jump	  through	  the	  hoop’’	  just	  to	  remain	  under	  consideration,	  but	  success	  in	  passing	  a	  hoop	  test	  does	  not	  strongly	  affirm	  a	  hypothesis.	  Van	  Evera’s	  apt	  example	  of	  a	  hoop	  test	  is,	  ‘‘Was	  the	  accused	  in	  the	  state	  on	  the	  day	  of	  the	  murder?’’	  Smoking	  gun	  tests	  strongly	  support	  a	  given	  hypothesis,	  but	  failure	  to	  pass	  such	  a	  test	  does	  not	  eliminate	  the	  explanation.	  They	  provide	  a	  sufficient	  but	  
not	  necessary	  criterion	  for	  confirmation.	  As	  van	  Evera	  notes,	  a	  smoking	  gun	  
	  
Table	  10.1.	  Process	  Tracing:	  Four	  Tests	  for	  Causation	  (a)	  
	  
Sufficient	  To	  Establish	  Causation	  (b)	  
	  
No	  	   	   	   	   Yes	  
Necessary	  to	  
Establish	  	   	   Straw	  in	  the	  Wind	  	   	   	  	  	  	  	  Smoking	  Gun	  
Causation	   	   Passing	  affirms	  relevance	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Passing	  confirms	  hypothesis.	  hypothesis	  but	  does	  not	  	   	  	  	  	  	  Failing	  does	  not	  eliminate	  it.	  
No	  	   	   	   confirm	  it.	  Failing	  suggests	  
	   	   	   hypothesis	  may	  not	  be	  relevant,	   	  	  	  	  	  but	  does	  not	  eliminate	  it.	  
	  
Yes	   	   	   Hoop	  	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  Doubly	  Decisive	  
Passing	  affirms	  relevance	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Passing	  confirms	  hypothesis	  and	   hypothesis	  but	  does	  not	  	   	  	  	  	  	  eliminates	  others.	  confirm	  it.	  Failing	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  Failing	  eliminates	  it	  eliminates	  it.	  	   	   .	  	  	  (a)	  The	  typology	  creates	  a	  new,	  two-­‐dimensional	  framing	  of	  the	  alternative	  tests	  originally	  formulated	  by	  Van	  Evera	  (1997:	  31–32).	  
(b)	  In	  this	  figure,	  ‘‘establishing	  causation,’’	  as	  well	  as	  ‘‘confirming’’	  or	  ‘‘eliminating’’	  an	  hypothesis,	  obviously	  does	  not	  involve	  a	  definitive	  test.	  Rather,	  as	  with	  any	  causal	  inference,	  qualitative	  or	  quantitative,	  it	  is	  a	  plausible	  test	  in	  the	  framework	  of	  (a)	  this	  particular	  method	  of	  inference	  and	  (b)	  a	  specific	  data	  set. 	  in	  the	  suspect’s	  hands	  right	  after	  a	  murder	  strongly	  implicates	  the	  suspect,	  but	  the	  absence	  of	  such	  a	  gun	  does	  not	  exonerate	  a	  suspect.	  
	  
Straw	  in	  the	  wind	  tests	  provide	  useful	  information	  that	  may	  favor	  or	  call	  into	  question	  a	  given	  hypothesis,	  but	  such	  tests	  are	  not	  decisive	  by	  themselves.	  They	  provide	  neither	  a	  necessary	  nor	  a	  sufficient	  criterion	  for	  establishing	  a	  hypothesis	  or,	  correspondingly,	  for	  rejecting	  it.	  	  Finally,	  doubly	  decisive	  tests	  confirm	  one	  hypothesis	  and	  eliminate	  others.	  They	  provide	  a	  necessary	  and	  sufficient	  criterion	  for	  accepting	  a	  hypothesis.	  Just	  one	  doubly	  decisive	  piece	  of	  evidence	  may	  suffice,	  whereas	  many	  straw	  
in	  the	  wind	  tests	  may	  still	  be	  indeterminate	  vis-­‐a`	  -­‐vis	  alternative	  explanations.	  Van	  Evera’s	  example	  is	  a	  bank	  camera	  that	  catches	  the	  faces	  of	  robbers,	  thereby	  implicating	  those	  photographed	  and	  exonerating	  all	  others.	  He	  emphasizes	  that	  in	  the	  social	  sciences	  such	  tests	  are	  rare,	  yet	  a	  hoop	  test	  and	  a	  smoking	  gun	  test	  together	  accomplish	  the	  same	  analytic	  goal	  (1997:	  32),	  a	  combination	  that	  is	  illustrated	  in	  the	  examples	  below.	  	  In	  process	  tracing	  and	  in	  applying	  these	  tests,	  it	  is	  essential	  to	  cast	  the	  net	  widely	  in	  considering	  alternative	  explanations.	  Other	  standard	  injunctions	  advocate	  gathering	  diverse	  forms	  of	  data,	  being	  meticulous	  and	  evenhanded	  in	  collecting	  and	  evaluating	  data,	  and	  anticipating	  and	  accounting	  for	  potential	  biases	  in	  the	  evidence	  (George	  and	  Bennett	  2005,	  Bennett	  and	  Elman	  2006).	  Further,	  as	  with	  all	  forms	  of	  causal	  inference,	  specific	  process	  tracing	  tests	  must	  be	  evaluated	  in	  relation	  to	  a	  wider	  body	  of	  evidence.	  These	  desiderata	  are	  especially	  important	  in	  process	  tracing	  on	  social	  and	  political	  phenomena	  for	  which	  participating	  actors	  have	  strong	  instrumental	  or	  ideational	  reasons	  for	  hiding	  or	  misrepresenting	  information	  about	  their	  behavior	  or	  motives.	  
	  
Example:	  Why	  the	  Fashoda	  Crisis	  Did	  Not	  Result	  in	  War	  	  Schultz	  provides	  excellent	  examples	  of	  the	  hoop	  test	  and	  smoking	  gun	  test	  in	  his	  analysis	  of	  the	  1898	  Fashoda	  crisis	  between	  Britain	  and	  France.	  This	  crisis	  arose	  over	  the	  confrontation	  between	  the	  two	  countries’	  expeditionary	  forces	  as	  they	  raced	  to	  lay	  claim	  to	  the	  Upper	  Nile	  Valley.	  War	  was	  averted	  when	  France	  backed	  down.	  With	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  inter-­‐democratic	  peace	  research	  program	  in	  the	  last	  several	  decades,	  this	  episode	  has	  assumed	  special	  interest	  as	  a	  near	  war	  between	  two	  democracies,	  leading	  scholars	  to	  closely	  scrutinize	  explanations	  of	  its	  non-­‐occurrence.	  	  
Schultz	  lays	  out	  three	  alternative	  explanations	  that	  scholars	  have	  offered	  for	  why	  the	  crisis	  was	  resolved	  without	  a	  war.	  Neorealists	  argue	  that	  France	  backed	  down	  simply	  because	  Britain’s	  military	  forces	  were	  far	  stronger,	  both	  in	  the	  region	  and	  globally	  (Layne	  1994).	  Schultz	  rejects	  this	  explanation	  because	  it	  fails	  to	  survive	  a	  hoop	  test:	  it	  cannot	  explain	  why	  the	  crisis	  happened	  in	  the	  first	  place,	  why	  it	  lasted	  two	  months,	  and	  why	  it	  escalated	  almost	  to	  the	  point	  of	  war,	  as	  it	  should	  have	  been	  obvious	  to	  France	  from	  the	  outset	  that	  Britain	  had	  military	  superiority	  (Schultz	  2001:	  177).	  A	  second	  argument,	  that	  democratic	  norms	  and	  institutions	  led	  to	  mutual	  restraint,	  also	  fails	  a	  hoop	  test	  in	  Schultz’s	  view.	  Whereas	  traditional	  democratic	  peace	  theorists	  emphasize	  the	  restraining	  power	  of	  democratic	  norms	  and	  institutions,	  the	  British	  public	  and	  British	  leaders	  were	  belligerent	  throughout	  the	  crisis	  in	  their	  rhetoric	  and	  actions	  toward	  France	  (Schultz	  2001:	  180–183).	  	  Schultz	  then	  turns	  to	  his	  own	  explanation:	  democratic	  institutions	  force	  democratic	  leaders	  to	  reveal	  private	  information	  about	  their	  intentions,	  making	  it	  difficult	  for	  them	  to	  bluff	  in	  some	  circumstances	  but	  also	  making	  threats	  to	  use	  force	  more	  credible	  in	  others.	  In	  this	  view,	  democratic	  institutions	  reinforce	  the	  credibility	  of	  coercive	  threats	  when	  domestic	  opposition	  parties	  and	  publics	  support	  these	  threats,	  but	  they	  undermine	  the	  credibility	  of	  threats	  when	  domestic	  groups	  publicly	  oppose	  the	  use	  of	  force.	  	  Schultz	  supports	  this	  explanation	  with	  smoking	  gun	  evidence.	  The	  credibility	  of	  Britain’s	  public	  commitment	  to	  take	  control	  of	  the	  region	  was	  resoundingly	  affirmed	  by	  the	  opposition	  Liberal	  Party	  leader	  Lord	  Rosebery	  (Schultz	  2001:	  188).	  Meanwhile,	  France’s	  Foreign	  Minister,	  Theophile	  Delcasse,	  initially	  voiced	  an	  intransigent	  position,	  but	  his	  credibility	  was	  quickly	  undermined	  by	  public	  evidence	  that	  other	  key	  French	  political	  actors	  were	  apathetic	  toward,	  or	  even	  opposed	  to,	  a	  war	  over	  Fashoda	  (Schultz	  2001:	  193).	  Within	  a	  matter	  of	  days	  after	  such	  costly	  signaling	  by	  both	  sides	  revealed	  Britain’s	  greater	  willingness	  and	  capability	  to	  fight	  for	  the	  Upper	  Nile,	  France	  began	  to	  back	  down,	  leading	  to	  a	  resolution	  of	  the	  crisis	  in	  Britain’s	  favor.	  In	  sum,	  the	  close	  timing	  of	  these	  events,	  following	  in	  the	  sequence	  predicted	  by	  Schultz’s	  theory,	  provides	  smoking	  gun	  evidence	  for	  his	  explanation;	  this,	  combined	  with	  the	  alternative	  explanations’	  failures	  in	  hoop	  tests,	  makes	  Schultz’s	  explanation	  of	  the	  Fashoda	  case	  convincing.	  
	  
Example:	  Expanding	  the	  Ends	  and	  Means	  of	  German	  
Strategy	  in	  World	  War	  I	  	  A	  second	  example	  shows	  how	  hoop	  tests	  and	  a	  smoking	  gun	  test	  help	  adjudicate	  among	  rival	  explanations	  for	  why	  Germany	  expanded	  both	  the	  ends	  and	  means	  of	  its	  wartime	  strategy	  in	  1916-­‐1917	  even	  as	  it	  was	  becoming	  obvious	  that	  Germany	  was	  losing	  World	  War	  I.	  Goemans	  convincingly	  argues	  that	  four	  developments	  in	  1916	  made	  it	  increasingly	  evident	  to	  German	  
leaders	  that	  they	  were	  unlikely	  to	  win	  the	  war:	  the	  German	  offensive	  at	  Verdun	  failed;	  Britain	  demonstrated	  its	  resolve—including	  its	  tolerance	  for	  c	  c	  casualties—in	  the	  battle	  of	  the	  Somme;	  Russia’s	  Brusilov	  offensive	  showed	  it	  could	  still	  fight;	  and	  Romania	  entered	  the	  war	  against	  Germany	  	  (Goemans	  2000:	  89–93).	  Meanwhile,	  President	  Wilson’s	  diplomatic	  note	  to	  Germany	  in	  April	  1916	  after	  the	  sinking	  of	  the	  unarmed	  SS	  Sussex	  made	  it	  clear	  that	  the	  United	  States	  was	  almost	  certain	  to	  enter	  the	  war	  against	  Germany	  if	  German	  U-­‐Boats	  sank	  any	  more	  merchant	  ships,	  which	  inhibited	  Germany	  from	  attacking	  merchantmen	  for	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  year.	  Despite	  these	  developments,	  in	  late	  1916	  Germany	  escalated	  its	  terms	  for	  concluding	  the	  war,	  expanding	  its	  claims	  on	  Polish	  territory	  and	  increasing	  the	  territorial	  or	  diplomatic	  concessions	  it	  demanded	  from	  France,	  Belgium,	  and	  Russia	  (Goemans	  2000:	  98–106).	  Moreover,	  Germany	  returned	  to	  unrestricted	  submarine	  warfare	  in	  early	  1917,	  even	  though	  the	  predictable	  consequence	  was	  that	  the	  United	  States,	  in	  quick	  response,	  entered	  the	  war.	  	  Why	  did	  Germany	  expand	  the	  ends	  and	  means	  of	  its	  war	  strategy	  even	  as	  its	  probability	  of	  victory	  declined?	  Goemans	  evaluates	  five	  rival	  explanations.	  A	  first	  alternative—that	  Germany	  should	  have	  behaved	  as	  a	  unitary	  actor	  and	  responded	  only	  to	  international	  considerations—fails	  a	  hoop	  test,	  based	  on	  thorough	  evidence	  that	  Germany’s	  goals	  in	  the	  war	  expanded	  even	  though	  German	  leaders	  themselves	  understood	  that	  their	  prospects	  for	  victory	  had	  diminished.	  A	  second	  argument,	  that	  Germany	  was	  irrevocably	  committed	  to	  hegemony	  throughout	  the	  war,	  is	  also	  undercut	  by	  evidence	  that	  German	  war	  aims	  increased	  over	  time.	  Goemans	  rejects	  a	  third	  argument—	  Germany’s	  authoritarian	  government	  made	  it	  a	  ‘‘bad	  learner’’	  impervious	  to	  evidence	  that	  it	  was	  losing	  the	  war—with	  ample	  indications	  that	  German	  leaders	  understood	  very	  well	  by	  late	  1916	  that	  their	  chances	  for	  victory	  were	  poor.	  A	  fourth	  explanation,	  that	  the	  change	  in	  Germany’s	  military	  leadership	  led	  to	  expanded	  military	  goals,	  begs	  the	  question	  of	  why	  Germany	  replaced	  its	  military	  leaders	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  the	  war	  (Goemans	  2000:	  74–75,	  93–105).	  	  Goemans	  then	  evaluates	  his	  own	  hypothesis:	  when	  semi-­‐authoritarian	  governments,	  like	  that	  of	  Germany	  during	  World	  War	  I,	  believe	  they	  are	  losing	  a	  war,	  they	  are	  likely	  to	  respond	  with	  war	  strategies	  that	  preserve	  at	  least	  a	  small	  probability	  of	  resounding	  victory,	  even	  if	  such	  strategies	  have	  a	  high	  likelihood	  of	  abject	  defeat.	  Goemans	  argues	  that	  for	  leaders	  in	  such	  governments,	  the	  consequences	  of	  negotiating	  an	  end	  to	  a	  war	  on	  modestly	  concessionary	  terms	  are	  little	  different	  from	  those	  of	  losing	  the	  war	  outright.	  In	  either	  case,	  semi-­‐authoritarian	  leaders	  are	  likely	  to	  lose	  their	  power	  and	  property	  (and	  perhaps	  even	  their	  lives)	  to	  domestic	  opponents	  who	  blame	  them	  for	  having	  demanded	  immense	  sacrifices	  from	  their	  societies	  in	  a	  losing	  cause.	  Thus,	  when	  evidence	  mounts	  that	  a	  semi-­‐authoritarian	  state	  is	  losing	  in	  a	  war,	  its	  leaders	  have	  an	  incentive	  to	  gamble	  for	  resurrection	  
and	  adopt	  riskier	  strategies	  that	  offer	  at	  least	  some	  slim	  hope	  of	  victory,	  even	  though	  they	  also	  increase	  the	  odds	  of	  utter	  defeat.	  	  Goemans	  provides	  a	  smoking	  gun	  test	  for	  this	  argument	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Ger-­‐	  many’s	  escalating	  war	  aims.	  Among	  many	  other	  pieces	  of	  evidence,	  he	  quotes	  the	  German	  military	  leader	  Erich	  Ludendorff	  as	  arguing	  in	  a	  private	  letter	  that	  radical	  and	  unacceptable	  domestic	  political	  reforms	  would	  be	  required	  to	  stave	  off	  unrest	  if	  Germany	  were	  to	  negotiate	  a	  concessionary	  peace.	  Specifically,	  Ludendorff	  argued	  that	  the	  extension	  of	  equal	  voting	  rights	  in	  Prussia	  ‘‘would	  be	  worse	  than	  a	  lost	  war’’	  (Goemans	  2000:	  114).	  This	  letter	  provides	  direct	  evidence	  of	  the	  German	  leadership’s	  desperation	  to	  avoid	  losing	  the	  war	  because	  of	  the	  political	  consequences	  for	  German	  leaders	  should	  they	  be	  blamed	  for	  having	  lost	  the	  war,	  and	  it	  thereby	  constitutes	  a	  smoking	  gun	  test	  that	  substantially	  validates	  Goemans’s	  main	  argument.	  
	  
Example:	  The	  Peaceful	  End	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  	  The	  final	  example	  concerns	  use	  of	  the	  hoop,	  smoking	  gun,	  and	  straw	  in	  the	  
wind	  tests	  to	  adjudicate	  among	  hypotheses	  about	  why	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  did	  not	  intervene	  militarily	  in	  the	  Eastern	  European	  revolutions	  of	  1989.4	  Three	  prominent	  accounts	  for	  the	  non-­‐use	  of	  force,	  involving	  standard	  alternative	  explanatory	  perspectives	  in	  the	  international	  relations	  field,	  are:	  (1)	  a	  realist	  hypothesis,	  which	  emphasizes	  the	  changing	  material	  balance	  of	  power;	  (2)	  a	  domestic	  politics	  hypothesis,	  which	  focuses	  on	  the	  changing	  nature	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union’s	  ruling	  coalition;	  and	  (3)	  an	  ideational	  hypothesis	  centered	  on	  Soviet	  leaders’	  lessons	  from	  their	  recent	  experiences.	  	  First,	  the	  most	  comprehensive	  realist/balance	  of	  power	  analysis	  of	  Soviet	  restraint	  in	  1989	  is	  offered	  by	  Brooks	  and	  Wohlforth	  (2000/2001;	  see	  also	  Wohlforth	  1994/1995,	  Oye	  1996).	  They	  argue	  that	  the	  decline	  in	  Soviet	  economic	  growth	  rates	  in	  the	  1980s,	  combined	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union’s	  high	  defense	  spending	  and	  its	  ‘‘imperial	  overstretch’’	  in	  Afghanistan,	  led	  to	  Soviet	  foreign	  policy	  retrenchment	  in	  the	  late	  1980s.	  Soviet	  leaders	  were	  constrained	  from	  using	  force	  in	  1989	  because	  this	  would	  have	  imposed	  large	  direct	  economic	  and	  military	  costs,	  risked	  economic	  sanctions	  from	  the	  West,	  and	  forced	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  to	  assume	  the	  economic	  burden	  of	  the	  large	  debts	  that	  Eastern	  European	  regimes	  had	  incurred	  to	  the	  West.	  In	  this	  view,	  changes	  in	  Soviet	  leaders’	  ideas	  about	  foreign	  policy	  were	  largely	  determined	  by	  changes	  in	  their	  material	  capabilities.	  	  Second,	  a	  domestic	  politics	  account	  has	  been	  well	  formulated	  by	  Snyder	  (1987/88).	  He	  argues	  that	  the	  long-­‐term	  change	  in	  the	  Soviet	  economy	  from	  extensive	  development	  (focused	  on	  basic	  industrial	  goods)	  to	  intensive	  development	  (involving	  more	  sophisticated	  and	  information-­‐intensive	  	  	  
	  	  4.	  I	  use	  this	  example	  in	  part	  because	  it	  involves	  my	  own	  research,	  making	  it	  easier	  to	  reconstruct	  the	  steps	  involved	  in	  the	  process	  tracing.	  See	  Bennett	  (1999,	  2003,	  2005).	  
 goods	  and	  services)	  shifted	  the	  ruling	  Soviet	  coalition	  from	  a	  military/	  heavy-­‐industry/party	  complex	  to	  a	  power	  bloc	  centered	  in	  light	  industry	  and	  the	  intelligentsia.	  This	  led	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  to	  favor	  improved	  ties	  to	  the	  West	  to	  gain	  access	  to	  technology	  and	  trade,	  and	  any	  Soviet	  use	  of	  force	  in	  Eastern	  Europe	  in	  1989	  would	  have	  damaged	  Soviet	  economic	  relations	  with	  the	  West.	  	  The	  third	  line	  of	  argument	  maintains	  that	  Soviet	  leaders	  learned	  lessons	  from	  their	  unsuccessful	  military	  interventions	  in	  Afghanistan	  and	  elsewhere	  that	  led	  them	  to	  doubt	  the	  efficacy	  of	  using	  force	  to	  try	  to	  resolve	  political	  problems	  like	  the	  Eastern	  Europeans’	  demands	  for	  independence	  from	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  in	  1989.5	  The	  Soviet	  Union	  invaded	  Afghanistan	  in	  December	  1979	  and	  kept	  between	  80,000	  and	  100,000	  troops	  there	  for	  a	  decade,	  with	  over	  14,000	  Soviet	  soldiers	  killed	  and	  53,000	  injured.	  When	  even	  this	  effort	  and	  substantial	  economic	  aid	  failed	  to	  make	  the	  communist	  party	  of	  Afghanistan	  capable	  of	  defending	  itself,	  Soviet	  leaders	  withdrew	  their	  military	  forces	  in	  February	  1989.	  The	  learning	  explanation	  argues	  that	  this	  experience	  made	  Soviet	  leaders	  unwilling	  to	  use	  force	  nine	  months	  later	  to	  keep	  in	  power	  Eastern	  European	  leaders	  who	  by	  that	  time	  faced	  strong	  public	  opposition.	  	  While	  scholars	  agree	  that	  the	  variables	  highlighted	  by	  all	  of	  these	  hypotheses	  contributed	  to	  the	  non-­‐use	  of	  force	  in	  1989,	  there	  remains	  considerable	  disagreement	  on	  how	  these	  variables	  interacted	  and	  their	  relative	  causal	  weight.	  Brooks	  and	  Wohlforth,	  for	  example,	  disagree	  with	  the	  ‘‘standard	  view’’	  that	  ‘‘even	  though	  decline	  did	  prompt	  change	  in	  Soviet	  foreign	  policy,	  the	  resulting	  shift	  could	  just	  as	  easily	  have	  been	  toward	  aggression	  or	  a	  new	  version	  of	  muddling	  through	  .	  .	  .	  and	  that	  other	  factors	  played	  a	  key	  role	  in	  resolving	  this	  uncertainty’’	  (2002:	  94).	  In	  contrast,	  I	  assert	  that	  this	  standard	  interpretation	  is	  persuasive	  and	  maintain	  that	  were	  it	  not	  for	  other	  factors,	  the	  economic	  decline	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  relative	  to	  the	  West	  could	  indeed	  have	  led	  to	  renewed	  Soviet	  aggression	  or	  to	  more	  years	  of	  muddling	  through.	  Specifically,	  I	  argue	  that	  although	  changes	  in	  the	  material	  balance	  of	  power	  made	  Soviet	  leaders	  more	  open	  to	  new	  ideas,	  the	  particular	  lessons	  Soviet	  leaders	  drew	  from	  their	  uses	  of	  force	  in	  the	  1970s	  and	  1980s	  greatly	  influenced	  the	  timing	  and	  direction	  of	  changes	  in	  Soviet	  foreign	  policy.	  	  What	  kinds	  of	  evidence	  can	  adjudicate	  among	  these	  hypotheses?	  In	  introducing	  a	  symposium	  on	  competing	  views	  on	  these	  hypotheses,	  Tannenwald	  
	  	  	  5.	  Bennett	  (1999,	  2003,	  2005).	  See	  also	  English	  (2000,	  2002);	  Checkel	  (1997);	  Gross	  Stein	  (1994).	  (2005)	  poses	  three	  questions	  for	  judging	  them:	  (1)	  Did	  ideas	  correlate	  with	  the	  needs	  of	  the	  Soviet	  State,	  actors’	  personal	  material	  interests,	  or	  actors’	  personal	  experiences	  and	  the	  information	  to	  which	  they	  were	  exposed?	  (2)	  Did	  material	  change	  precede	  or	  follow	  ideational	  change?	  (3)	  Do	  material	  or	  ideational	  factors	  better	  explain	  which	  ideas	  won	  out?	  Each	  of	  these	  questions	  creates	  opportunities	  for	  process	  tracing	  tests.	  Focusing	  on	  the	  first	  question,	  about	  the	  correlation	  of	  policy	  positions	  with	  material	  versus	  ideational	  variables,	  we	  find	  some	  evidence	  in	  favor	  of	  each	  explanation.	  Citing	  Soviet	  Defense	  Minister	  Yazov	  and	  others,	  Brooks	  and	  Wohlforth	  argue	  that	  Soviet	  conservatives	  and	  military	  leaders	  did	  not	  question	  Gorbachev’s	  concessionary	  foreign	  policies	  because	  they	  understood	  that	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  was	  in	  dire	  economic	  straits	  and	  needed	  to	  reach	  out	  to	  the	  West.	  They	  also	  point	  to	  ample	  evidence	  that	  Gorbachev	  argued	  that	  Soviet	  economic	  decline	  created	  a	  need	  for	  better	  relations	  with	  the	  West	  (Brooks	  and	  Wohlforth	  2000/2001).	  Their	  explanation	  thus	  satisfies	  a	  hoop	  test:	  given	  the	  salience	  of	  both	  economic	  issues	  and	  relations	  with	  theWest,	  Brooks’s	  andWohlforth’s	  argument	  would	  be	  unsustainable	  without	  considerable	  evidence	  that	  Soviet	  leaders	  linked	  the	  two	  in	  their	  public	  and	  private	  statements.	  	  However,	  Robert	  English	  suggests	  that	  the	  evidence	  we	  have	  employed	  in	  this	  hoop	  test	  is	  not	  definitive,	  and	  he	  points	  to	  other	  statements	  by	  Soviet	  conservatives	  indicating	  opposition	  to	  Gorbachev’s	  foreign	  policies.	  He	  concludes	  that	  ‘‘whatever	  one	  believes	  about	  the	  old	  thinkers’	  acquiescence	  in	  Gorbachev’s	  initiatives,	  it	  remains	  inconceivable	  that	  they	  would	  have	  launched	  similar	  initiatives	  without	  him’’	  (English	  2002:	  78).	  In	  this	  view,	  much	  of	  the	  evidence	  linking	  material	  decline	  to	  Soviet	  retrenchment	  depends	  on	  the	  Gorbachev’s	  individual	  views	  and	  the	  political	  institutions	  that	  gave	  him	  power,	  rather	  than	  any	  direct	  and	  determinative	  tie	  between	  material	  decline	  and	  specific	  foreign	  policies.	  	  Two	  other	  hoop	  tests	  yield	  more	  definitive	  evidence	  against	  Snyder’s	  sectoral	  interest	  group	  hypothesis	  and	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  learning	  hypothesis.	  Consistent	  with	  Snyder’s	  argument,	  Soviet	  military	  leaders	  at	  times	  argued	  against	  defense	  spending	  cuts,	  and	  the	  conservatives	  who	  attempted	  a	  coup	  against	  Gorbachev	  in	  1990	  represented	  the	  Stalinist	  coalition	  of	  the	  military	  and	  heavy	  industry.	  Soviet	  Conservatives,	  however,	  did	  not	  argue	  that	  force	  should	  have	  been	  used	  to	  prevent	  the	  dissolution	  of	  the	  Warsaw	  Pact	  in	  1989,	  even	  after	  they	  had	  fallen	  from	  power	  in	  1990	  and	  had	  little	  to	  lose	  (Bennett	  2005:	  104).	  Indeed,	  military	  leaders	  were	  among	  the	  early	  skeptics	  regarding	  the	  use	  of	  force	  in	  Afghanistan,	  and	  many	  prominent	  
officers	  with	  personal	  experience	  in	  Afghanistan	  resigned	  their	  commissions	  rather	  than	  participating	  in	  the	  1994–1997	  Russian	  intervention	  in	  Chechnya	  (Bennett	  1999:	  339–340).	  This	  suggests	  that	  the	  learning	  explanation	  has	  survived	  a	  difficult	  hoop	  test	  by	  correctly	  anticipating	  that	  those	  military	  officers	  who	  personally	  experienced	  failure	  in	  Afghanistan	  would	  be	  among	  the	  opponents	  rather	  than	  the	  supporters	  of	  using	  force	  in	  later	  circumstances.	  
 Concerning	  Tannenwald’s	  second	  question,	  about	  the	  timing	  of	  material	  and	  ideational	  change,	  Brooks	  and	  Wohlforth	  have	  not	  indicated	  precisely	  the	  time	  frame	  within	  which	  material	  decline	  would	  have	  allowed	  or	  compelled	  Soviet	  foreign	  policy	  change,	  stating	  only	  that	  material	  incentives	  shape	  actions	  over	  the	  ‘‘longer	  run’’	  (2002:	  97).	  This	  suggests	  that	  the	  timing	  of	  changes	  in	  Soviet	  policy	  in	  relation	  to	  that	  of	  changes	  in	  the	  material	  balance	  of	  power	  is	  at	  best	  a	  straw	  in	  the	  wind	  test.	  Brooks’s	  and	  Wohlforth’s	  logic	  allows	  for	  the	  possibility	  that	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  could	  profitably	  have	  let	  go	  of	  its	  Eastern	  European	  empire	  in	  1973.	  By	  that	  time,	  nuclear	  parity	  guaranteed	  the	  Soviet	  Union’s	  security	  from	  external	  attack,	  and	  high	  energy	  prices	  meant	  that	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  could	  have	  earned	  more	  for	  its	  oil	  and	  natural	  gas	  from	  world	  markets	  than	  from	  Eastern	  Europe.	  Moreover,	  the	  sharpest	  decline	  in	  the	  Soviet	  economy	  came	  after	  1987,	  by	  which	  time	  Gorbachev	  had	  already	  begun	  to	  signal	  to	  governments	  in	  Eastern	  Europe	  that	  he	  would	  not	  use	  force	  to	  rescue	  them	  from	  popular	  opposition	  (Brown	  1996:	  249).	  The	  timing	  of	  changes	  in	  Soviet	  policy	  therefore	  does	  not	  lend	  strong	  support	  for	  the	  ‘‘material	  decline’’	  hypothesis.	  	  The	  timing	  suggested	  by	  the	  ideational	  explanation	  coincides	  much	  more	  closely	  with	  actual	  changes	  in	  Soviet	  foreign	  policy.	  Despite	  slow	  Soviet	  economic	  growth,	  Soviet	  leaders	  were	  optimistic	  about	  the	  use	  of	  force	  in	  the	  developing	  world	  in	  the	  late	  1970s	  due	  to	  the	  ease	  with	  which	  they	  inflicted	  a	  costly	  defeat	  on	  the	  United	  States	  in	  Vietnam,	  but	  they	  became	  far	  more	  pessimistic	  regarding	  the	  efficacy	  of	  force	  as	  their	  failure	  in	  Afghanistan	  deepened	  through	  the	  1980s	  (Bennett	  1999).	  Furthermore,	  changes	  in	  Soviet	  leaders’	  public	  statements	  generally	  preceded	  changes	  in	  Soviet	  foreign	  policy,	  suggesting	  that	  the	  driving	  factor	  was	  ideational	  change,	  rather	  than	  material	  interests	  justified	  by	  ad	  hoc	  and	  post	  hoc	  changes	  in	  stated	  ideas.	  In	  this	  regard,	  the	  ideational	  explanation	  survives	  a	  hoop	  test:	  if	  changes	  in	  Soviet	  leaders’	  ideas	  motivated	  changes	  in	  their	  policies,	  rather	  than	  being	  merely	  rationalizations	  for	  policy	  changes	  adopted	  for	  instrumental	  reasons,	  then	  changes	  in	  these	  ideas	  had	  to	  precede	  those	  in	  behavior	  (Bennett	  1999:	  351–2).	  	  Tannenwald’s	  third	  question,	  on	  why	  some	  ideas	  won	  out	  over	  others,	  is	  the	  one	  most	  effectively	  addressed	  by	  hoop	  tests.	  Here,	  although	  Snyder	  does	  not	  specifically	  apply	  his	  domestic	  politics	  argument	  to	  Soviet	  restraint	  in	  the	  use	  of	  force	  in	  1989,	  his	  contention	  that	  the	  material	  interests	  of	  different	  
sectors	  were	  the	  driving	  factor	  in	  Soviet	  policy	  appears	  to	  fail	  a	  hoop	  test	  (Snyder	  1990).	  Outlining	  in	  early	  1988	  the	  (then)	  hypothetical	  future	  events	  that	  could	  in	  his	  view	  have	  caused	  a	  resurgence	  of	  the	  Stalinist	  coalition	  of	  the	  military	  and	  heavy	  industry,	  Snyder	  argued	  that	  the	  rise	  of	  antireform	  Soviet	  leaders	  would	  become	  much	  more	  likely	  if	  Gorbachev’s	  reforms	  were	  discredited	  by	  poor	  economic	  performance	  and	  if	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  faced	  ‘‘a	  hostile	  international	  environment	  in	  which	  SDI	  [the	  Strate-­‐	  gic	  Defense	  Initiative]	  was	  being	  deployed,	  Eastern	  Europe	  was	  asserting	  its	  autonomy,	  and	  Soviet	  clients	  were	  losing	  their	  counterinsurgency	  wars	  in	  Afghanistan,	  Angola,	  and	  Ethiopia’’	  (Snyder,	  1988:	  128).	  	  	  As	  it	  turned	  out,	  all	  these	  conditions	  were	  more	  than	  fulfilled	  within	  two	  years,	  except	  for	  the	  deployment	  of	  a	  working	  SDI	  system.	  Yet	  apart	  from	  the	  unsuccessful	  coup	  attempt	  of	  1990,	  Soviet	  hardliners	  never	  came	  close	  to	  regaining	  power.	  Snyder’s	  theory	  thus	  appears	  to	  have	  failed	  a	  hoop	  test	  when	  the	  developments	  he	  thought	  would	  bring	  the	  Stalinist	  coalition	  back	  to	  power	  indeed	  took	  place,	  but	  the	  Stalinists	  still	  did	  not	  prevail.	  Conversely,	  the	  learning	  explanation	  survives	  a	  hoop	  test	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  evidence	  that	  antiinterventionist	  ideas	  won	  out	  because	  they	  resonated	  with	  recent	  Soviet	  experiences,	  rather	  than	  because	  their	  advocates	  represented	  a	  materially	  powerful	  coalition.	  	  Despite	  strong	  evidence	  that	  both	  material	  and	  ideational	  factors	  played	  a	  role	  in	  Soviet	  restraint	  in	  1989,	  one	  variant	  of	  the	  material	  explanation	  appears	  to	  fail	  a	  hoop	  test.	  Two	  internal	  Soviet	  reports	  on	  the	  situation	  in	  Europe	  in	  early	  1989,	  one	  by	  the	  International	  Department	  (ID)	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Communist	  Party	  and	  one	  by	  the	  Soviet	  Institute	  on	  the	  Economy	  of	  the	  World	  Socialist	  System	  (IEMSS	  in	  Russian),	  argued	  that	  a	  crackdown	  in	  Eastern	  Europe	  would	  have	  painful	  economic	  consequences	  for	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  including	  sanctions	  from	  the	  West.	  The	  IEMSS	  report	  also	  noted	  the	  growing	  external	  debts	  of	  Soviet	  allies	  in	  Eastern	  Europe	  (Bennett	  2005:	  96–7).	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  these	  reports	  provide	  ample	  evidence	  for	  the	  learning	  explanation:	  the	  IEMSS	  report	  warns	  that	  a	  crackdown	  in	  Poland	  could	  lead	  to	  an	  ‘‘Afghanistan	  in	  the	  Middle	  of	  Europe’’	  (Bennett	  2005:	  101),	  and	  the	  ID	  report	  argues	  that	  ‘‘authoritarian	  methods	  and	  direct	  pressure	  are	  clearly	  obsolete	  .	  .	  .	  it	  is	  very	  unlikely	  we	  would	  be	  able	  to	  employ	  the	  methods	  of	  1956	  [the	  Soviet	  intervention	  in	  Hungary]	  and	  1968	  [the	  Soviet	  intervention	  in	  Czechoslovakia],	  both	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  principle,	  but	  also	  because	  of	  unacceptable	  consequences’’	  (Bennett	  2005:	  97).	  	  While	  both	  material	  and	  ideational	  considerations	  played	  a	  role,	  there	  is	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  at	  least	  in	  one	  respect	  the	  former	  was	  not	  a	  factor	  in	  Gorbachev’s	  thinking	  in	  the	  fall	  of	  1989.	  In	  a	  meeting	  on	  October	  31,	  1989,	  just	  ten	  days	  before	  the	  Berlin	  Wall	  fell,	  Gorbachev	  was	  reportedly	  ‘‘astonished’’	  
at	  hearing	  from	  East	  German	  leader	  Egon	  Krenz	  that	  East	  Germany	  owed	  the	  West	  $26.5	  billion,	  almost	  half	  of	  which	  had	  been	  borrowed	  in	  1989	  (Zelikow	  and	  Rice	  1995:	  87).	  Thus,	  while	  Gorbachev	  was	  certainly	  concerned	  about	  Soviet	  economic	  performance,	  the	  claim	  that	  he	  was	  in	  part	  inhibited	  from	  using	  force	  in	  Eastern	  Europe	  because	  of	  the	  region’s	  external	  debts	  appears	  to	  have	  failed	  a	  hoop	  test	  because	  almost	  up	  until	  the	  Berlin	  Wall	  fell,	  Gorbachev	  did	  not	  even	  know	  the	  extent	  of	  these	  debts.	  	  In	  sum,	  the	  material	  decline	  explanation	  passes	  a	  hoop	  test	  by	  showing	  that	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  Soviet	  leaders	  acknowledged	  Soviet	  decline,	  and	  a	  straw	  
in	  the	  wind	  test	  on	  the	  timing	  of	  changes	  in	  Soviet	  foreign	  policy,	  but	  the	  variant	  of	  this	  explanation	  that	  stresses	  East	  German	  debts	  as	  a	  factor	  preventing	  the	  Soviet	  use	  of	  force	  in	  1989	  fails	  a	  hoop	  test.	  The	  learning	  explanation	  survives	  hoop	  tests	  in	  its	  expectations	  on	  which	  actors	  would	  espouse	  which	  foreign	  policy	  views,	  on	  the	  timing	  of	  changes	  in	  Soviet	  ideas	  and	  policies,	  and	  on	  why	  some	  ideas	  prevailed	  over	  others.	  The	  sectoral	  domestic	  politics	  explanation	  emerges	  as	  the	  weakest,	  having	  failed	  hoop	  tests	  on	  its	  predicted	  correlation	  of	  policy	  views	  and	  material	  interests	  and	  its	  expectations	  on	  which	  ideas	  would	  win	  out	  in	  which	  contexts.	  
	  
CONCLUSION	  	  Through	  process	  tracing,	  scholars	  can	  make	  valuable	  inferences	  if	  they	  have	  the	  right	  kind	  of	  evidence.	  ‘‘Right	  kind’’	  means	  that	  some	  types	  of	  evidence	  have	  far	  more	  probative	  value	  than	  others.	  The	  evidence	  must	  strongly	  discriminate	  between	  alternative	  hypotheses	  in	  the	  ways	  discussed	  above.	  The	  idea	  of	  hoop	  tests,	  smoking	  gun	  tests,	  doubly	  decisive	  tests,	  and	  straw	  in	  the	  wind	  
tests	  brings	  into	  focus	  some	  of	  the	  key	  ways	  in	  which	  this	  discrimination	  occurs.	  What	  matters	  is	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  evidence	  and	  the	  hypotheses,	  not	  the	  number	  of	  pieces	  of	  evidence.	  	  Process	  tracing	  is	  not	  a	  panacea	  for	  causal	  inference,	  as	  all	  methods	  of	  causal	  inference	  are	  potentially	  fallible.	  Researchers	  could	  fail	  to	  include	  an	  important	  causal	  variable	  in	  their	  analyses.	  Available	  evidence	  may	  not	  discriminate	  strongly	  between	  competing	  and	  incompatible	  explanations.	  Actors	  may	  go	  to	  great	  lengths	  to	  obscure	  their	  actions	  and	  motivations	  when	  these	  are	  politically	  sensitive,	  biasing	  available	  evidence.	  Yet	  with	  appropriate	  evidence,	  process	  tracing	  is	  a	  powerful	  means	  of	  discriminating	  among	  rival	  explanations	  of	  historical	  cases	  even	  when	  these	  explanations	  involve	  numerous	  variables.	  
